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ABSTRACT 
      SoundCloud is an online service provider that allows users 
to upload, share, and download music that they have created.  It 
is an innovative platform for both amateur and established 
producers and disc jockeys (DJs) to showcase their original 
tracks and remixes.  Unfortunately, it is also a platform that 
lends itself to widespread copyright infringement.  Looking 
toward potential litigation, several factors ought to be 
considered by SoundCloud and other similar providers.  The 
Viacom v. YouTube case, decided in the Southern District of 
New York and now currently on appeal in the Second Circuit, 
sheds light on the potential liability service providers like 
SoundCloud face.  It draws out the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’s (DMCA) safe harbor provisions under which SoundCloud 
could potentially find protection.  However, SoundCloud is 
unique among similar service providers because it provides 
users with a variety of viewing, sharing and downloading 
options that are built into the platform. These options could lead 
to infringement that would not fall under a DMCA safe harbor.  
This Issue Brief will discuss the various arguments to be made 
for and against SoundCloud’s liability, and examine whether the 
unique utility provided by the service to users could be sustained 
in the face of potential litigation. Ultimately, the safeguards used 
by SoundCloud to filter blatant infringement, combined with the 
DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor, should allow this innovative 
platform to maintain its current model without neutering its core 
functionality.      
INTRODUCTION 
 Modern Internet technology allows music listeners to access 
their favorite songs from any location.  Services like YouTube and 
GrooveShark lend server space to users who upload music and stream 
the content for public consumption.  SoundCloud, founded in 2007 and 
based in Berlin, Germany,1 expands upon this idea through encouraging 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
† J.D. candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law; B.A., 2009, UC 
Berkeley. Thank you to everyone who contributed to this Brief. 
1  SoundCloud Review, APP APPEAL, http://www.appappeal.com/app/soundcloud  
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
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users to create their own works and upload them to share with others.  
The ease of sharing music through SoundCloud has led to it being 
referred as “the YouTube of Internet Audio files.”2   
 
 The problem faced by SoundCloud, as is true of similar service 
providers, is that, in addition to original music, an abundance of 
copyrighted material is uploaded by users who abuse the service.3  
Exacerbating the problem, the platform’s promotion of the sharing and 
creation of new music allows users to freely upload musical creations 
that are often derivative works – that is, samples and remixes – of 
copyrighted tracks.  The design of the platform complicates the task of 
separating songs that have been altered enough to constitute a new work 
from those that may have been minimally altered simply to hide the fact 
that the song is copyrighted.  Thus, SoundCloud’s challenge becomes 
identifying uses of the platform that might give rise to copyright 
infringement, while still allowing the unique presentation and 
distribution of non-infringing music.   
 
 To combat infringing uses of its service, SoundCloud has 
recently implemented the use of Audible Magic, a “fingerprinting 
technology” that can automatically identify copyrighted works.4  
However, Audible Magic, at best, works inconsistently.5  Most direct 
copies of copyrighted songs are consistently removed, as Audible 
Magic’s audio recognition software accurately identifies songs that have 
not been altered.6  Unfortunately, problems arise when the technology 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Anna Leach, Why the Challenger MySpace Should Be Worried About is 
SoundCloud, not Facebook, SHINY SHINY (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.shinyshin 
y.tv/2011/03/why_the_challenge_myspace_soundcloud_not_facebook.html.  
3 See, e.g., tiger_mendoza, Comment to Copyright Infringement Notice from 
SoundCloud, GYBO, http://www.gybo5.com/viewtopic.php?p=24505 (Oct. 23, 
2010, 11:46 AM) (detailing the experience of having SoundCloud files removed 
for copyright infringement); Ryan Tranzmission, Copyright Wars: Tranzmission 
vs. Interpol vs. SoundCloud, TRANZMISSION (Aug. 28, 2010, 8:16 PM), 
http://www.thetranzmission.com/2010/08/copyright-wars-tranzmission-vs-
interpol.html (reporting a SoundCloud request to remove a track the author 
believed he obtained permission to upload). 
4 Eamonn Forde, SoundCloud Partners with Audible Magic for Rights 
Identification, MUSICWEEK (Jan. 5, 2011, 10:05 AM), http://www.musicweek. 
com/story.asp?storyCode=1043741&sectioncode=1. 
5 See Scott Smitelli, Fun with YouTube’s Audio Content ID System, COMPUTER 
SCIENCE HOUSE (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.csh.rit.edu/~parallax/ (finding that 
“any pitch or time alterations will also work [to thwart Audible Magic], 
provided you apply a 6% or greater change to the parameter you are adjusting”). 
6 See Technology Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/techno 
logy.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (detailing how Audible Magic identifies 
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attempts to analyze remixes and samples. Some of these altered songs are 
successfully identified and removed, while other alterations of the same 
song are allowed by Audible Magic’s algorithms to remain available.7 
This leads to situations where users whose works are flagged will find 
that others’ works, which seem to equally infringe, remain untouched.  
The presence of remixes that slip through the fingerprinting technology 
and exist in the grey area of copyright law8 may also be what eventually 
leads copyright holders to pursue litigation against SoundCloud. 
  
 This Issue Brief will describe SoundCloud’s platform and how it 
might give rise to a prima facie case for infringement.  It will also 
explore available Digital Millennium Copyright Act9 (“DMCA”) safe 
harbors, as well as possible fair use defenses tailored to the unique 
functionality of SoundCloud.  Finally, it will argue that the current 
growth of the platform can be sustained without having to sacrifice the 
original creative utility provided to users. 
 
I.  SOUNDCLOUD’S PLATFORM 
 
 The SoundCloud collection of tools creates visual 
representations of sound, allows playback and downloading of audio 
files, and encourages other users to provide feedback at specific points 
throughout the waveform (a waveform player that visualizes sound).10  
Revenue is generated using a tiered subscription model with no 
advertisements.11  Because of this subscription model, SoundCloud’s 
revenue stream does not suffer as much from the use of Audible Magic 
as an ad-based model would.12 With SoundCloud’s subscription model, 
unless the user is solely purchasing extra server space to store and share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
snippets of audio files and then matches the sound clip with a database 
containing more than 11 million copyrighted songs). 
7 Id. 
8 See Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing…Oh My!: How Hip 
Hop Music Is Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law, EXPRESSO, 
3 (2011) (discussing a circuit split over the fair use status of remixes), available 
at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=tonya_ 
evans.  
9 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2006). 
10 Your Sound, in the Player, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/tour/ (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
11 Eliot Van Buskirk, SoundCloud Threatens MySpace as Music Destination for 
Twitter Era, WIRED (Jul. 6, 2009, 5:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter 
/2009/07/soundcloud-threatens-myspace-as-music-destination-for-twitter-era/. 
12 Infra, Part I.C. 
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infringing material, users will still pay the initial signup fee because 
utility remains to be derived from legitimate uses of the service.13 
 
A. Features 
  
 SoundCloud’s software takes an audio file and visualizes the 
sound, creating a “waveform” map through which other users can 
identify a specific moment or section of the music that they enjoyed.14  
The waveform is depicted below in Figure 1. 
 
 
 Figure 1: SoundCloud waveform15 
 
 This visualization gives users an alternative conceptualization of 
how the music was produced – allowing them to note where a particular 
section begins or ends and how sounds are aggregated together to 
produce the final piece.16 Users can then leave their personal comment or 
suggestions at specific points in the waveform, creating a potential back–
and–forth between users.17   
 
 
  Figure 2: Timed comment box18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Id. 
14 Your Sound, in the Player, supra note 10.  
15 Id. 
16 See, e.g., Those Bloody Yanks! SOUNDCLOUD http://soundcloud.com/those-
bloody-yanks (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (depicting visually where sound 
buildup occurs and entering breaks to signify a change in the momentum of the 
song). 
17 Id. 
18 Your Sound, in the Player, supra note 10. 
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 The ability to display the components of a particular song while 
receiving continuous feedback makes SoundCloud a particularly 
appealing platform for new artists trying to build a network.19  It is also 
useful to more established producers and DJs, who are looking for a way 
to quickly distribute new songs to a large audience.20  SoundCloud’s 
uniquely interactive features help to create a feeling of personal 
investment in others’ songs, strengthening the sense of community 
among users in that particular music genre.  The waveforms can be 
embedded on separate sites such as blogs21 or even directly into a 
Facebook profile.22  Widgets that instantly notify all of a user’s followers 
of a new upload are also available.23  Users also have the option of 
allowing a file to be downloadable or keeping a file private to select 
users.24   
  
 Through these interactive tools, SoundCloud “puts your sound at 
the heart of communities, websites and even apps.”25  A user can “watch 
conversations, connections and social experiences happen” through the 
medium of sharing music.26 It is this call to personal creativity and 
musical innovation, along with no file–size limit and customizable 
sharing options, that separates this platform from other similar services 
like MySpace.27  Ironically, it is precisely because of these unique 
features, together with SoundCloud’s emphasis on “your sound,” that the 
uploader often assumes that they own the audio files. Because of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Van Buskirk, supra note 11 (noting that artists can quickly share 
improvements and thoughts on new music).   
20 See id. (emphasizing SoundCloud’s connection to social media services such 
as Facebook and Twitter). 
21 See id. (explaining that SoundCloud creates a unique URL for each of an 
artist’s tracks, which allows them to embed the music elsewhere). 
22 David Noël, Updated Facebook Application, SOUNDCLOUD BLOG (Jan. 15, 
2010), http://blog.soundcloud.com/2010/01/15/facebook/. 
23 Mike Ziarko, SoundCloud Social Music Community Lets You Visually 
Comment On Music, SOCIAL TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.socialtimes.com/2010/12/soundcloud-social-music-community-lets-
you-visually-comment-on-music/. 
24 SoundCloud Review, supra note 1.  
25 SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
26 Id. 
27 Van Buskirk, supra note 11 (“In a few short months SoundCloud has begun to 
give mighty MySpace a run for the hearts and minds of recording artists eager to 
interact more nimbly with fans than is possible on the giant social network 
which has, for the past five years, been the de facto online platform for 
musicians.”). 	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ubiquity of this misnomer, the presence of copyright–infringing material 
on SoundCloud remains pervasive.28 
 
B.  Monetization Model 
 
 As of February 2011, SoundCloud had over three million users.29  
Growth of the service exploded as the user base increased by over one 
million in a span of one hundred days.30  Expansion of the platform into 
an iPhone application was just one factor that helped spur this 
exponential increase.31  With this growth, SoundCloud found new 
opportunities to differentiate between higher value and lower value users. 
As a result of this differentiation, SoundCloud monetizes its increasing 
user base by providing a variety of accounts, including both a free and 
paid option.32  SoundCloud’s free version provides the basic waveform 
tools, but caps the number of uploadable minutes and does not provide 
secret link sharing.33  Accounts are then available at increasing price 
intervals with additional features available at each interval.34  Users can 
access more hours for uploads, more efficient distribution channels, and 
greater recognition for their musical creations – all depending on how 
much they are willing to pay.35  Available upload hours do not reset 
monthly or yearly, rather, each account level has a set limit that can only 
be increased by purchasing a better plan.36  There are no third party 
advertisements at any account level, but the top Premium accounts allow 
unlimited uploading, adjustable privacy settings, and unlimited 
contacts.37 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See tiger_mendoza, supra note 3 (noting a user’s removal of files for 
copyright infringement); Tranzmission, supra note 3 (detailing a request to 
remove a track thought to be uploaded with permission). 
29 SoundCloud Reaches Three Million User Mark, NME (Feb 11, 2011, 1:43 
PM), http://www.nme.com/news/various-artists/54934. 
30 Martin Bryant, SoundCloud Hits 3 Million Users, Grows by 50% in 100 days, 
TNW EUROPE (Feb. 10, 2011), http://thenextweb.com/eu/2011/02/10/ 
soundcloud-hits-3-million-users-grows-by-50-in-100-days/. 
31 SoundCloud Reaches Three Million User Mark, supra note 29.  
32 See SoundCloud Premium, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/premium/ 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Help/Premium & Billing, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/help/pre 
mium-accounts (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
37 Van Buskirk, supra note 11. 
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C. Audible Magic 
 
  Since the beginning of 2011, SoundCloud has used Audible 
Magic’s content identification technology38 to identify the upload of 
copyrighted material in a database containing millions of songs.39  
Because SoundCloud’s revenue model is tied to providing better services 
in return for compensation – as opposed to accumulating as many page 
views as possible – Audible Magic’s prevention of infringing uploads 
does not hurt SoundCloud’s bottom line as it would a site like 
YouTube.40  This conclusion is founded on the presumption that users 
who want to use SoundCloud’s server space to upload and distribute 
infringing material would be unlikely to pay monthly for premium 
service.41  If a user consistently and knowingly uploaded infringing 
material, the reasonable choice for such a user would be to use the free 
account.  Such a user has no need to pay for extra features when free 
accounts already allow the essential secret link sharing and download 
options.  On the other hand, when a premium user, such as a well-known 
DJ, is blocked from uploading music deemed by Audible Magic to be 
infringing, that unspent upload time could still be used to upload 
legitimate songs.  These professionals are the type of users that 
SoundCloud has historically attracted, although the attraction of such 
users may be coming to an end.42   
  
 Despite the progressive nature of this technology, Audible Magic 
presents numerous problems.  Tests have shown that basic audial 
manipulation of a copyrighted track – often accomplished through 
remixes and samples without even intending to avoid Audible Magic’s 
detection – will fool the algorithm.43  Given that SoundCloud’s platform 
encourages users to borrow and modify content, Audible Magic fails to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Forde, supra note 4.  
39 Technology Overview, supra note 6. 
40 See Michael Rappa, Business Models on the Web, DIGITAL ENTERPRISE 
(2010), http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html (advertising models 
work best when the volume of viewer traffic is large and subscription fees are 
incurred irrespective of actual usage rate). 
41 Id. 
42 See Miles Raymer, SoundCloud Raining on Its Own Parade, CHICAGO 
READER (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/sharp-darts-
soundcloud-copyright/Content?oid=3351152 (noting that “DJs were the early 
adopters that helped [SoundCloud] reach critical mass,” but they are feeling 
betrayed by recent practices that “appear to defer to rights holders”). 
43 See Smitelli, supra note 5 (finding that the algorithm only recognizes a sound 
clip if it is a certain length, while changes in pitch, tempo, or background white 
noise may successfully cloak the clip).  
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catch many uploads that infringe copyrights.44 The difficulty for 
SoundCloud is that their target market is primarily comprised of DJs, 
producers, and remixers, all of whose music frequently borrows and 
samples from copyrighted material.45 These users witness the prevalence 
of such remixed music on SoundCloud and are led to erroneously believe 
that no serious legal repercussions exist due to uploading potentially 
infringing content. Ultimately, a significant number of infringing files 
are successfully uploaded to SoundCloud’s servers,46 but are not 
removed without the copyright holder’s proactive search and notice 
action.47 
 
II.  DMCA § 512(C) SAFE HARBOR 
 
 To avoid liability, SoundCloud ought to look to the recent 
Viacom v. YouTube48 decision. The presence of a high volume of 
arguably illegal remixes on SoundCloud’s servers may prompt major 
record labels or other rights holders to sue.49   Through an understanding 
of the court’s reasoning in YouTube, SoundCloud and other similar 
service providers can better understand the implications of the DMCA § 
512(c) safe harbor, while anticipating how to best qualify for 
protection.50   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See Larisa Mann, Walling Off Another Garden: Is Soundcloud Turning on Its 
Supporters?, RIPLEY (Dec. 25, 2010), http://djripley.blogspot.com/2010/12/ 
walling-off-another-garden-is.html (positing that much of the content on 
SoundCloud would be considered infringing material). 
45 Id. 
46 See Evans, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the circuit split over whether remixes 
of copyrighted songs are still illegal). 
47 Copyright holders may file a takedown notice for an upload that they believe 
to be infringing. The service provider is required to remove the accused upload 
even if the copyright holder presents no evidence that it is actually infringing. 
The uploader may then file a counter–notice that would force the copyright 
holder to provide proof. Mann, supra note 44.  
48 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
49 See id. (noting that copyright holder Viacom was suing YouTube over “tens 
of thousands of videos [that] were taken unlawfully” (quoting Brief for Viacom, 
at 1)).	  
50 See generally Cassius Sims, A Hypothetical Non-Infringing Network: An 
Examination of the Efficacy of Safe Harbor in Section 512(c) of the DMCA, 
2009 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2009) (detailing the various elements of DMCA 
Section 512(c) and the standards by which service providers might qualify for 
protection). 
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A. The YouTube Decision’s Interpretation of DMCA Safe 
Harbors  
 
 1. Relevant § 512 provisions 
 
 Section 512(c)(1) of the DMCA states that a service provider 
will not be liable for storing copyright-infringing material if the service 
provider: (a) “does not have actual knowledge that the material or 
activity using the material on the system is infringing”; (b) “in the 
absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent”; or (c) “upon obtaining such 
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access 
to, the material.”51  As an additional requirement, the service provider 
cannot have received “a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity” when the service provider “has the right and ability 
to control such activity.”52  Finally, § 512(c)(1)(C) requires the service 
provider, when notified of a claimed infringement by the copyright 
holder, to quickly “remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”53  
  
 Section 512(c)(2) and (3) articulate the steps necessary to satisfy 
the notification requirement, and include the service provider’s 
designation of an agent to receive notices, as well as what information 
the notice needs to provide.54 Section 512(m) specifically provides that 
the § 512(c) safe harbor is not predicated on “(1) a service provider 
monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing 
activity, except to the extent consistent . . . with the provisions of 
subsection (i)” or “(2) a service provider gaining access to, removing, or 
disabling access to material in cases in which such conduct is prohibited 
by law.”55  Rather, § 512(i) requires a qualifying service provider to 
implement a system that “provides for the termination in appropriate 
circumstances of subscribers and account holders . . . who are repeat 
infringers.”56  Service providers must also “accommodat[e] and . . . not  
interfere with standard technical measures.”57  
 
 In YouTube, the court identified a “critical question” with regard 
to YouTube’s qualification for the DMCA safe harbor.58 This question 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1) (2006). 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 517–18. 
55 Id. at 518. 
56 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1). 
57 Id.  
58 YouTube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 519. 
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was whether the “actual knowledge” and “facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent” language in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) 
required a general awareness by YouTube of infringements, or in fact 
required the higher standard of “actual or constructive knowledge of 
specific and identifiable infringements of individual items.”59  The court 
held that the higher standard of actual or constructive knowledge was 
indeed required.60 
 
2. Legislative History 
 
 The Senate and House Reports concerning the DMCA 
demonstrated Congress’ dual concerns of providing an effective method 
to combat clear and repeated cases of infringement while simultaneously 
ensuring that these methods were not overly onerous for service 
providers.61  One of the concerns that led to the creation of the safe 
harbor, after all, was to protect important service providers from having 
to implement practices that would be impractical to execute on a large 
scale.62  In YouTube, the court initially examined the text of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary Report, and noted that the overarching 
purpose of the DMCA was to “ensure[] that the efficiency of the Internet 
will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on 
the Internet will continue to expand.”63  Next, the court looked at the 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the House Committee on 
Commerce Report to find clarification for § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)’s “actual 
knowledge” language.64 The court ruled that “actual knowledge” means 
“actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable 
infringements.”65 Finally, the court examined the Reports’ explanation 
regarding how to approach the § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) “red flag” test, which 
articulates how to know that an “infringing activity is apparent.”66 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 520. 
61 See id. at 522–23 (discussing § 512(d) – which deals with information 
location tools – and elaborating on specificity requirements as well as “red flag” 
cases of infringement involving “pirate” sites that lead service providers to a 
greater likelihood of awareness of infringement in the absence of actual 
knowledge. Also discussing the purpose of the safe harbor to “promote the 
development” of service providers like Yahoo! as long as they follow the notice 
and takedown requirements). 
62 See id. at 523 (discussing § 512(d) and its proscription that “awareness of 
infringement . . . should typically be imputed to a directory provider only with 
respect to pirate sites or in similarly obvious and conspicuous circumstances”). 
63 Id. at 519. 
64 Id. at 519–23. 
65 Id. at 519. 
66 Id.  
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 The House and Senate Reports on the passage of the DMCA 
describe § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as a “red flag” test that requires “both a 
subjective and an objective element.”67  The test’s subjective element 
involves a determination of the “awareness of the service provider of the 
facts or circumstances in question.”68  An objective standard is then used 
to determine “whether those facts or circumstances constitute a ‘red flag’ 
– in other words, whether infringing activity would have been apparent 
to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar 
circumstances.”69 
  
 The YouTube court went on to examine the Reports’ comparison 
between § 512(d)’s “need for specificity” when dealing with information 
location tools like Yahoo! and the § 512(c) provisions.70  The Reports 
state that under the “actual knowledge” and “not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” language, “a 
service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright 
infringement.”71  However, a service provider “would not qualify for the 
safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious 
infringement.”72  The court went on to elaborate that, “[a]bsent such ‘red 
flags’ or actual knowledge,” however, a directory provider cannot be 
reasonably expected to know whether content is infringing from a “brief 
cataloguing visit.”73  This test was made to “strike[] the right balance” 
for online editors and cataloguers, as it is unreasonable to require them to 
“make discriminating judgments about potential copyright infringement” 
unless the case is “obviously pirate.”74 Therefore, a high level of 
certainty of repeated infringement is required before the name of a party 
or site can be qualified as a “red flag.”75  From a policy perspective, the 
court reasoned that “information location tools are essential to the 
operation of the Internet,” and requiring a higher standard for human 
judgment and discretion – when the legal question is already complicated 
enough – would have a chilling effect on whether directory providers are 
willing to keep cataloguing potentially infringing material.76  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court seemed to be guided by the utilitarian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Id. at 520. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 520–21. 
70 Id. at 522. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. (explaining an example of a clear red flag where a directory provider 
came across a “pirate” site that allowed downloading of copyrighted material).  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 523. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
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conception of potential societal loss outweighing the rights holders’ 
actual loss.   
  
 YouTube applied a similar utilitarian rationale to service 
providers as well.77  In terms of efficiency, the court believed that rights 
holders themselves were in the best position to identify infringing 
material and determine whether they actually wanted to stop the 
infringing action.78   After analyzing further commentary on other § 512 
provisions, the court concluded that the DMCA did not intend to force 
service providers like YouTube to affirmatively seek “facts indicating 
infringing activity" in order to qualify for safe harbor protection.79  
  
 The House and Senate Reports also give clarification regarding 
how to apply § 512(c)(1)(B), the provision that bars service providers 
from receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity. The court stated that “[i]n determining whether the financial 
benefit criterion is satisfied, courts should take a common-sense, fact-
based approach, not a formalistic one.”80  This means “in general, a 
service provider conducting a legitimate business would not be 
considered to receive a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity’ where the infringer makes the same kind of payment 
as non-infringing users of the provider's service.”81  For example, 
“receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments for service 
from a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute 
receiving a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity.’”82  This analysis is an especially relevant consideration when 
trying to fit SoundCloud’s particular monetization model under § 
512(c)(1)(B).83 
 
3. Case History 
 
 The YouTube decision identified the outcome of the case as 
turning on how specific the § 512(c)(1)(A) “actual knowledge” 
requirement was, and what kind of “awareness” of infringement was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Id. 
78 See id. at 524 (reasoning that the amount of infringing material on a service 
provider’s servers may be insignificant and the copyright owner or licensor is in 
the best position to determine if they actually want to fight a case of 
infringement). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 521. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See infra, Part II.B.2. 
No. 1] NEW DIGITAL MUSIC SHARING PLATFORMS 157 
expected from service providers.84  The court ultimately held that 
“general knowledge that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ does not impose a 
duty on the service provider to monitor or search its services for 
infringement.”85  The court reached this conclusion after examining 
previous cases that, while not directly applicable as precedent, used a 
line of reasoning appropriate to service providers that were comparable 
in size and function to YouTube.86 
  
  The court drew further justification for its interpretation from 
Tiffany Inc. v. eBay,87 which involved a claim of contributory liability for 
trademark infringement.88  There, the court held that Tiffany needed to 
show that eBay knew of “specific instances of actual infringement,” and 
had more than a “generalized notice that some portion of the Tiffany 
goods sold on its website might be counterfeit.”89  Drawing parallels 
between YouTube and eBay, the court decided that Congress, through the 
DMCA, intended the copyright holder to bear the burden of identifying 
specific instances of infringement.90  Because of this, without a showing 
that YouTube knew of specific infringing material and did not quickly 
remove it, Viacom could not win its case through § 512(c)(1)(A).91 
  
 Regarding the § 512(c)(1)(B) “financial benefit” requirement, 
Viacom argued that YouTube received ad revenue which was directly 
attributable to the infringing content in question.92  Despite this, the court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Amanda Bronstad, ‘Viacom v. YouTube’ Appeal May Decide Future of Web, 
LTN L. TECH. NEWS (Dec 14, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologyne 
ws/PubArticleFriendlyLTN.jsp?id=1202476144090&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
85 Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 525. 
86 See id. at 524 (explaining that if the identification of cases of infringement 
required an investigation of “facts and circumstances,” then those cases did not 
constitute “red flags,” and explaining that a “blatant” showing of infringement 
was necessary to prove that Amazon had actual knowledge of infringement by 
its users). 
87 Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir 2010). 
88 Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 525. 
89 Id. (quoting Tiffany, 600 F.3d 93 at 106–07).  
90 See id. (explaining that although Tiffany did not involve the DMCA, the 
DMCA applies the same principle: without a “red flag” or notice from the owner 
of specific instances of infringement, the service provider is not obligated to 
identify the infringement).  
91 See id. (“[I]f a service provider knows . . . of specific instances of 
infringement, the provider must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, 
the burden is on the owner to identify the infringement. General knowledge that 
infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ does not impose a duty on the service provider to 
monitor or search its service for infringements.”).	  
92 Id. at 527. 
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– scrutinizing § 512(c)(1)(B)’s “right and ability to control” language – 
reasoned that “the provider must know of the particular case before he 
can control it.”93  Because it is the burden of the copyright holder to alert 
YouTube of specific cases of infringement, YouTube will virtually never 
“control” infringing material without having first received notice from 
the owner.94  After receiving notice and promptly removing the offending 
material, the court found that YouTube had by all accounts acted in good 
faith compliance with the DMCA guidelines for quick removal, and 
could therefore not be held liable for infringement.95 
  
B. Application of § 512(c) to SoundCloud 
 
 Using the YouTube court’s guidelines for applying § 512(c) to 
service providers, SoundCloud and other similar platforms should fall 
under the DMCA safe harbor, thereby limiting their potential liability for 
infringing material uploaded to their servers.  However, because 
YouTube is still on appeal in the Second Circuit, SoundCloud needs to 
consider the pertinent arguments made against YouTube and protect 
itself accordingly.96    
 
1. § 512(c)(1)(A) Analysis 
 
 YouTube’s interpretation of the “actual knowledge” standard 
would require SoundCloud to have knowledge of “specific and 
identifiable infringements of particular items” beyond the “mere 
knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general.”97  Since 
SoundCloud does not directly monitor uploads – instead utilizing the 
Audible Magic technology to preemptively stop infringement – this 
argument is unlikely to succeed on behalf of rights holders in a potential 
suit.  Even if the title of an uploaded song indicated that the song could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id.  
94 See id. (“[T]he provider must know of the particular case [of infringement] 
before he can control it.”). 
95 See id. at 524 (explaining that after receiving notice of over 100,000 
infringing videos from Viacom, YouTube “had removed virtually all of them” 
by the next business day). 
96 Cf. Mike Masnick, YouTube’s Reply In Viacom Case Demolishes Each of 
Viacom’s Key Arguments, TECHDIRT (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:48 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110401/02080513719/youtubes-reply-viaco 
m-case-demolishes-each-viacoms-key-arguments.shtml (describing YouTube’s 
response to Viacom’s appeal). 
97 Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 523. 
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potentially infringe a copyright,98 this would not constitute “actual 
knowledge” under the court’s ruling.  The artist of such a remix might 
secure a license from the original musician, for example, but a 
SoundCloud employee would be unable to know this without further 
inquiry.  SoundCloud will need to know that the song is infringing, 
which, if the song passes the Audible Magic filter, requires proactively 
contacting the presumed rights holder.  Such a requirement arguably 
extends to the type of “investigative duties” that the Ninth Circuit in 
Perfect 10 v. Google99 attempted to discourage.100  The “actual 
knowledge” requirement will therefore be difficult to prove.   
 
 A more challenging standard for SoundCloud to overcome will 
be the § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) “is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent” language, and the “red flag” test 
used to verify it.    The operative question will be whether any “red 
flags” objectively exist on SoundCloud’s servers – meaning “whether 
infringing activit[ies] would have been apparent to a reasonable person” 
in the “same or similar circumstances” as one of SoundCloud’s 
employees.101 Even if material can objectively be identified as a “red 
flag,” the subjective element still exists, which requires determining how 
aware SoundCloud is of these red flags.  Awareness will be easier to 
impute if the infringing content is highly visible, such as content 
available on the SoundCloud “Explore Tracks” page,102 or if the artists 
themselves are highly visible.  If such a clearly infringing song somehow 
bypassed Audible Magic, and became popular enough to reach that level 
of exposure, then SoundCloud would be forced to act under § 
512(c)(1)(A)(iii) by removing that content. 
 
 The DMCA’s legislative history indicates that due to “factual 
circumstances” and “technical parameters” that “may vary from case to 
case, it is not possible to identify a uniform time limit for expeditious 
action.”103  When SoundCloud does receive specific knowledge of 
infringing material, it is almost always through the copyright holder’s 
notice, at which point SoundCloud acts swiftly in accordance with § 
512(c)(1)(A)(iii), sending out takedown notices almost immediately.104  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Such potential infringement might, for instance, be identified as a remix of a 
top pop song appearing on SoundCloud’s “Hot” list. See, e.g., Explore Tracks, 
SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/tracks (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
99 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007). 
100 See Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 524 (quoting Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114). 
101 Id. at 520–21. 
102 See Explore Tracks, supra note 98 (listing the “Hot” and “Latest” tracks).  
103 Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 521. 
104 See Mann, supra note 44 (discussing how producers often complain about 
having remixes taken down due to copyright complaints). 
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The alacrity of SoundCloud’s response is likely to satisfy the 
“expeditious action” requirement elucidated in YouTube, especially 
considering that the statute is flexible enough to utilize case–specific 
determinations when deciding the appropriate time limit.  If the YouTube 
decision stands in the Second Circuit, then SoundCloud’s emulation of 
YouTube’s procedural safeguards against infringement should allow it to 
stand up to a § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) challenge. 
 
2. § 512(c)(1)(B) Analysis 
  
  SoundCloud’s business model can be used to eliminate the 
financial benefit SoundCloud receives from the presence of infringing 
material on its servers.  The way that the DMCA’s legislative history 
treats service providers requiring a “one-time set-up fee and flat periodic 
payments” strongly supports the conclusion that SoundCloud meets the § 
512(c)(1)(B) requirement.105  SoundCloud can also apply the YouTube 
court’s ruling that “control” is not possible without specific knowledge – 
and as it was with YouTube – that the DMCA does not place the burden 
on the provider to proactively seek specific knowledge of infringing 
uploads.  However, it may be argued that, by allowing its users to upload 
and download songs in greater quantities as the user pays more, 
SoundCloud has created a key feature that incentivizes paying for 
premium accounts and therefore violates § 512(c)(1)(B).  This argument 
would necessarily be premised on the proposition that SoundCloud’s 
limit on uploading and downloading for free accounts is purposely 
instituted. SoundCloud would have to be aware of infringing material 
uploaded to its servers, and want users to purchase higher level accounts 
in order to upload with less restrictions. This, however, is a difficult 
argument to support, and as such SoundCloud should not be concerned 
with § 512(c)(1)(B).      
 
3. § 512(c)(1)(C) Analysis 
 
 SoundCloud, like YouTube, needs to be sure to identify and 
eliminate blatant and repeated infringement, which is already being done 
through the implementation of Audible Magic.  SoundCloud can address 
the more egregious cases of potential infringement that slip past the 
technology by following  § 512(c)(1)(C)’s provisions for timely notice 
and takedown.106  An examination of SoundCloud’s terms of use 
demonstrates rigorous adherence to the DMCA’s guidelines.107  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 521. 
106 Id. at 522. 
107 See SoundCloud Terms of Use, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/terms-
of-use (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) (including, among other compliance–related 
terms, that “any unauthorized use of copyright protected material within Your 
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SoundCloud’s notice and takedown procedures have been implemented 
with rights holders’ interests as a primary main concern, and as such 
should satisfy § 512(i)(1)(A)’s “reasonably implemented” 
requirement.108 
 
 4. Summation 
  
  The central legal concern for SoundCloud remains the fact that 
potentially infringing material exists on its servers, and the legality of 
such material is difficult for the service provider to unilaterally determine 
without the assistance of rights holders.  If the district court’s holding in 
YouTube stands on appeal, SoundCloud should have strong assurance 
that their policies will fully protect them against liability under the 
DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor.  In the meantime, the use of Audible Magic 
should function effectively as a precautionary mechanism for 
SoundCloud.109  Moving forward, the real problem for SoundCloud will 
be reconciling their preventative measures with the original creative 
purpose of their platform.110  The safeguards that SoundCloud has 
instituted, while wise from a legal point of view, cast too wide a net.111  
Echoing this sentiment, one blogger noted that “computers, for example, 
have no algorithm to determine fair use.”112  SoundCloud is taking 
precautionary action by monitoring their own content at the point of 
upload while the YouTube appeal approaches, but for now, such action 
functions more as a burden borne on both the service provider and its 
users before it is truly necessary. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Content (including by way of reproduction, distribution, modification, 
adaptation, public display, public performance, preparation of derivative works, 
making available or otherwise communicating to the public via the Platform) 
may constitute an infringement of third party rights and is strictly prohibited.”). 
108 Raymer, supra note 42. 
109 Mike Masnick, Permission Culture And The Automated Diminishment Of 
Fair Use, TECHDIRT (Dec. 27, 2010, 2:32 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles 
/20101227/09520712421/permission-culture-automated-diminishment-fair-
use.shtml.  
110 See Phil Morse, Why You Shouldn’t Post Your Mixes On SoundCloud, 
DIGITAL DJ TIPS (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.digitaldjtips.com/2011/03/why-
you-shouldnt-post-your-mixes-on-soundcloud/ (“[M]ost of the material on 
SoundCloud of interest to DJs comprises DJ mixes or reworks, remakes and 
remixes that can’t be found through official channels.”). 
111 See id. (“[DJs] can no longer trust a DJ mix posted on SoundCloud to remain 
there.”). 
112 Mike Masnick, How Copyright Filters Present A Serious Challenge to DJ 
Culture, TECHDIRT (Mar. 21, 2011, 10:11 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20110311/01520813455/how-copyright-filters-present-serious-challenge-to-dj-
culture.shtml. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
    SoundCloud’s future is dependent upon the eventual resolution 
of the YouTube case.113  If service providers like YouTube are found to 
fall outside the DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor, SoundCloud and many 
other platforms designed to share original music could no longer rely 
freely on user–generated content without facing increased liability for 
infringing material that inevitably ends up on their servers.114  Such 
platforms may ultimately rely on fingerprinting technology like Audible 
Magic to satisfy copyright holders’ concerns about widespread 
infringement on their site.  Despite this, technology such as Audible 
Magic needs to adapt to the myriad ways users alter audio files before it 
can effectively filter out a majority of the infringing content.115  In the 
meantime, the hit–or–miss approach of manual removal will continue to 
frustrate artists who hoped to utilize the platform in a variety of wholly 
legal ways.116  SoundCloud will soon need to make a decision to either 
follow a conservative approach until a conclusive ruling is made in 
YouTube – and risk further alienating its user base – or rely on a system 
of notice and takedown that may not be sufficient to escape liability.  
Considering the nature of the platform and the societal utility derived 
from service providers like SoundCloud and YouTube, SoundCloud 
would be wise to remember what made them successful in the first place, 
until the courts determine they should act otherwise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See Rob Arcamona, What the Viacom vs. YouTube Verdict Means for 
Copyright Law, MEDIASHIFT (Jul 2, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2010 
/07/what-the-viacom-vs-youtube-verdict-means-for-copyright-law183.html. 
114 Masnick, supra note 109.  
115 See Smitelli, supra note 5 (concluding that “it is quite possible to thwart . . . 
[filtration] system[s]”). 
116 See Morse, supra 110 (discussing the removal of arguably legal material). 
